korean unification studies

With Presidents Roh and Bush having a very public misunderstanding at the APEC Leaders Summit, it’s a good time to address the question of ROK-US relations in the context of Korean unification.

First, the misunderstanding. It is hard to think of two more ineffectual national spokespersons – and for all you Bush supporters out there, c’mon the man had earlier stated that he was happy to be with John Howard at OPEC… And Roh was no better. His ineffectual pushing in the press lounge demonstrated a distinct lack of diplomatic understanding and finesse. As Roh pushed for Bush to ‘make his position clearer’ on ending the Korean War, Bush’s aides could be seen visibly shaken – like tourists in Seoul dodging their first noodle delivery bike.

 Today, there seems to be three general approaches in the ROK policy community regarding ROK-US relations and inter-Korean relations:

• ROK-US relations and inter-Korean relations are mutually exclusive;
• ROK-US relations are more important than inter-Korean relations. Inter-Korean relations should only be pursued through close coordination with wider US strategy.
• ROK-US relations are integral to inter-Korean relations, but require careful management to ensure ROK interests are not subsumed by US interests.

The first approach is a narrow, short-term, results focused approach. National interest is pursued in ROK-US relations and national interest is pursued in inter-Korean relations. However, coordination between the two is absent. Accordingly, pursuing national interest in one area (reducing tension on the peninsula by promoting engagement) flies in the face of national interest in the other area (promoting strong alliance relationship). The short-sighted nature of the approach often means it is reactive as opportunities and challenges present themselves.

Unfortunately, it is an approach that seems to predominate in the liberal camp. It almost seems that policymakers responsible for ROK-US relations and policymakers responsible for inter-Korean relations live in parallel universes, with each group never considering how one affects the other.

The second approach represents the other extreme, and is also often associated with the opposite political extreme, the conservative camp. Followers of this approach believe ROK-US relations are central to the ROK’s national interest and should be given precedence over all else. Accordingly, inter-Korean relations should be pursued only in accordance with wider US strategy. This is extreme and wrong. It places US national interests above South Korean national interests – something that has never happened, even at the height of South Korea’s authoritarian administrations. Further, while the first approach suffers from its short-sightedness, the second approach suffers from debilitating inflexibility.

The third approach, represents moderation and pragmatism. Without any emotion, neither for nor against, it has to be recognized that the US is the most benign major power with both an interest in the region and a capability to play a role. If handled correctly, this represents an opportunity for Korean unification. Compared to China, Russia and Japan, unification does not threaten US national interests. Indeed, given the likelihood of the North Korean population becoming strong supporters of the US relationship after unification, the US has much to gain. Accordingly, of all major powers with an interest in the Korean peninsula, it is only the US that is not predisposed to opposing unification.

However, US national interests and South Korean national interests are not the same – and South Korean policy makers must pursue South Korean national interests above US national interests. Accordingly, it is essential for South Korea to be particularly skillful in diplomacy. It must convince the US that South Korean national interests (engagement, long-term unification) are US national interests (WMD and missile counter-proliferation, democratic values).

More at ROKDrop and DPRKStudies…