But, theories do change according to technology and implementation. That’s the interesting part of geostrategic studies, the interplay between practice and research. For example, the way that airpower theory was debated by military planners and politicians between Kosovo and the Israeli-Hizbullah War showed how professors learn from the air force, and the generals take academic or professional material (like Douhet’s theories) seriously.

There is some progress and deconstruction of the IR part, but it happens on a stable template. It’s not a gaming situation where the premises are adjusted to tweak the conclusions.

As for the Philippines – that explains why so many Koreans are moving down there!

In historical time, South Korea has existed for a very brief time. Especially, when one considers that “Korea” as an independent political and cultural entity nearly disappeared from the peninsula between 1910-45, I wouldn’t put too much stock in this latest version. Kingdoms come and go on the peninsula. Korea, divided as it is because of China, is only as viable as it is because China needed decades to survive a series of revolutions, and Japan was defeated in WW2. But the patterns of interference from the mainland up north and Japan in the south endure. That’s what makes the peninsula special and different from Europe or the Americas or Australia.

To maintain political authority over the peninsula in the way you would argue, Korea would have to be more than middling, but hegemonic in the region. The real difference now in the region is that there is a bilateral contest between equally powerful Chinese and Japanese states, and Korea cannot match either. That two hobbled states could catch up and still outpace Korea again only underscores the limitations the peninsula places on its inhabitants. If it were the Philippines islands, I would give Korea a chance, but not on a peninsula right in the middle of two vipers.

Having emerged as a middle power, South Korea is increasingly less of the ‘pivot’ you describe. As a middle power, it has a much greater ability to determine its own path, and will likely deal with major powers in much the same way as other middle powers do – seeking compromise in international disputes, seeking multilateral solutions to global problems and displaying a greater degree of ‘good international citizenship’.

And as noted by Martin Wright in the book ‘Power Politics’, ultimately in circumstances of wartime, middle powers are capable of inflicting costs upon a major power out of proportion to what a major power can achieve through attacking it. As a middle power, South Korea is today much less of a pivot, than it has historically been.

In the absence of an incredibly strong regime (that would probably not last more than a few centuries and would attract more competitors than what the effort would be worth), the default mode of a pivot is a political and economic mess that creates crises for the more robust, viable regimes around it. Solutions to a pivot revolve around the agendas the external powers have, not the needs of the pivot. If Japan and China find a way not to scorch Korean earth every century, it won’t be because of what North and South Korea can do. Really, it’s irrelevant which side each Korean state backs.