After years of a strongly confrontational approach (with substantial tangible security gains, but little improvements in the intangible ‘sense’ of security) the South Korean public swung to the opposite side. Now they are ready to swing back.

Hopefully, in time a less extreme medium can be reached (engagement after all does rely on a combination of both strength and reconciliation). Perhaps as you say an elevated, but monitored, level of humanitarian aid, even along the lines of the original Sunshine Policy.

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Yep, first name ‘Gunther’, second name ‘Dilworth’

If engagement “works” longer term, what it will accomplish is a stronger northern regime still not interested in unification under any terms other than its own. If political change does occur in North Korea (e.g., a change in the Kim family cult, etc.), it’s highly unlikely that a ROK policy would be the cause.

Being non-confrontational and keeping an elevated – but monitored – level of humanitarian aid is good, and even what the Sunshine Policy was supposed to be would not have been bad. But it has instead morphed into a policy of enabling and appeasement that accomplishes nothing, except to prolong the torture of those in DPRK gulags.

South Korea’s engagement is worse than useless in its current form.

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On a separate note, are “Dilworth” and “Gunter” the same persons?

However, engagement as a policy cannot be judged over the short period of time. It is a long term strategy (which granted is difficult to conceive of when one thinks of NK human rights).

Over time, the trickle of information and ideas that engagement brings to North Korea will hopefully result in change. It is likely that there will be no tangible security benefits from the Summit in the short term, but in the long term, as one small part of a much wider engagement effort it could bring change to North Korea.

What other options are there that don’t involve the risk of war, humanitarian disasters and economic upheaval?

Real or not, there is a sense that the peninsula has become more peaceful since the commencement of South Korean engagement policy.

Over time there have been no reduction in, for instance, naval mishaps along the NLL, KPA have actually increased along the DMZ, no reduction in artillery or missiles directed at Seoul, a continuation of missile testing, and a nuclear test. That’s a false sense of having, “become more peaceful.”

Anecdotal evidence does show a change in North Korean perceptions of the South. Interviews with North Korean defectors. . .

I’d say it’s more than just anecdotal, but only the smallest minority of defectors are from the elite, which is the group that matters. Engagement is double-edged sword for the regime elite as they want to reap the unmonitored aid from South Korea, but do not want to let destabilizing information in that would threaten their positions.

Again, Kim Jong-il will use this summit to extract maximum aid from South Korea, but will give nothing tangible in return.

Real or not, there is a sense that the peninsula has become more peaceful since the commencement of South Korean engagement policy. There is evidence of this in the incremental rise in South Korean sovereign ratings by international ratings agencies such as Moody’s and S&P since the commencement of engagement.

There is also the even less tangible security benefit of changed North Korean attitudes. Less tangible because we can really only assume that engagement is the causal effect. Anecdotal evidence does show a change in North Korean perceptions of the South. Interviews with North Korean defectors [see the recent book 'Saram-eui Tongil, Ddang-eui Tongil' by Cheon Woo-Taek] show a big difference between North Korean perceptions of South Korea over the last ten years.

While the Summit is not going to be a magical spell that will greatly advance engagement, in the greater context of North-South relations, it is still a significant and potentially important historical event.

My major concern is that the Summit will get caught up in the filth, selfishness and lack of vision that permeates the domestic political scene.

Is the Summit part of a long-term vision for peace and prosperity or is it merely a tool to be crudely manipulated for short-term domestic political gain?

I think North Korean leadership has made it abundantly clear on many occasions over time that they do not consider South Korea to be a worthy partner for peace negotiations; North Korea only wants to deal with the U.S. on that issue. All the South Korean efforts related to engagement have gained absolutely no tangible security benefits, and indeed have seen further North Korean missile tests and of course the nuclear test. Clearly the upcoming summit is nothing more than a forum for the DPRK to extract all it can from South Korea while giving nothing in return. Roh’s party will gain nothing from it. Only the North Korean elite gain in this game.